ABSOLUTE IDEALISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL REALISM

Both of these philosophical orientations are possible today - and probably any position, if taken to its limit, has to reduce to one of these two, if it is sincerely metaphysical.   Transcendental realism supposes that in principle we cannot, at least not at our current level of rationality, think absolute reality, but that the sciences get closer and closer.  And whatever the absolute is, it is utterly prior to human kind and does not care about us.  It is not a mind, and it is not inside our minds:  it is really out there, it is value-neutral, we cannot know it absolutely but we can acquire relative true knowledge about it.  

Absolute idealism posits that in some sense reality is a mind or a will - that physical and biological articulations, just like social and psychological ones, have a mental, emotive, normative character.  Many philosophers who think of themselves as materialist are actually absolute idealists in an expanded sense of the term.    We are able to directly know and even unite with this mental/volitional substrate, which is why this idealism is absolute rather than transcendental (a transcendental idealism, like Kant's, would ultimately resign itself to skepticism about the nature of the absolute in itself).  

The bitter debate that took place between Graham Harman and Peter Wolfendale a few years ago perhaps demonstrates that the antagonism between these two positions is the philosophical deadlock of our era.  Again (much like the post on the antagonism internal to accelerationism that I just wrote in the Eschatology section), for Transcendental Qabala, it is a question of stepping out of the deadlock somehow - pushing it to its limit so as to yield a new position.  

It would be easy to point to a potential category mistake involved in the antagonism - to say that the two are not really asking the same questions or seeking the same kind of knowledge.   But to do that is basically to fall in line with the tradition of ascribing different territories to faith and reason, respectively, so that they don't interfere with each other.    But there seems something conservative about that approach - it is not the work of participatory renihilation that I'm so interested in.